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This paper shows that there is a natural trade-oﬀ when designing market based exec-
utive compensation. The beneﬁt of market based pay is that the stock price aggregates
speculators’ dispersed information and therefore takes a picture of managerial performance
before the long-term value of a ﬁrm materializes. The cost is that informed speculators’
willingness to trade depends on trading that is unrelated to any information about the
ﬁrm. Ideally, the CEO should be shielded from shocks that are not informative about
his actions. But since information trading is impossible without non-information trading
(due to the ”no-trade” theorem), shocks to prices caused by the latter are an unavoidable
cost of market based pay. This trade-oﬀ generates a number of insights about the impact
of market conditions, e.g. liquidity and trading horizons, on optimal market based pay.
A more liquid market leads to more market based pay while short-term trading makes it
more costly to provide such incentives leading to lower CEO eﬀort and worse ﬁrm per-
formance on average. The model is consistent with recent evidence showing that market
based CEO incentives vary with market conditions, e.g. bid-ask spreads, the probability
of informed trading (PIN) or the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts.
Keywords: executive compensation, moral hazard, liquidity, trading, stock price informativeness
JEL classification: G39, D86, D82
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February 2007Non-technical summary 
 
Why does CEO pay include measures of stock price performance? What are the limits 
to such market based pay? To what extent do trading conditions, e.g. trading horizons, 
matter for the cost and benefit of market based CEO pay and, ultimately, real firm 
performance? Despite a large literature on executive compensation and debates about 
market based CEO pay, there is hardly any research on how trading conditions in the 
stock market matter for market based compensation. This paper attempts to fill the 
gap and shows that there is a natural trade-off when designing market based pay. 
The benefit of market based pay is that the market as a whole, i.e. the sum of all 
traders' information, takes a picture of managerial performance at an early stage 
before the final long-term value of a firm materializes. In a competitive market in 
which the ownership of listed companies is dispersed, it is impossible to access all 
traders' information directly. Self-interested trading overcomes this communication 
problem, albeit imperfectly. It is well known that in order to make room for 
information trading, some people must trade for reasons other than information about 
the value of the firm, e.g. stochastic life cycle motives or the need to fulfil margin 
calls. The cost of market based pay therefore is that it will necessarily be contingent 
on such noise trading although noise trading per se is not informative about 
managerial effort. The pay of a risk averse CEO should ideally be shielded from 
shocks that are not related to information about his performance, but this is impossible 
with market based pay. 
Market based CEO pay will be proportional to the liquidity of the market for the 
company’s shares since a more liquid market allows more information based trading. 
More non-information or noise trading increases the liquidity of the market but it also 
adds pure noise to the stock price. The paper shows that the overall impact is negative 
since noise trading reduces the information content of the stock price. 
The paper then examines the impact of shortening the investment horizon of traders 
on the balance between the benefit and the cost of market based pay. Speculators with 
short horizons act less on their private information since the stock price reflects this 
information only imperfect at the time they need to sell the asset. This reduces the 
amount of information trading relative to noise trading. The stock price becomes less 
5
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February 2007informative about managerial performance, market based incentives weaken and 
managerial effort subsides leading to worse firm performance on average. 
Recent empirical research establishes a significant cross-sectional link between the 
extent of stock-based CEO pay and trading conditions that is consistent with our 
analysis. The paper’s prediction that shorter investment horizons of traders should 
lead to less market based CEO pay and lower CEO effort has not yet been tested 
directly. There is however a sharp increase in the positive link between measures of 
stock price informativeness, e.g. PIN (probability of informed trading), volume or 
bid-ask spreads, and the sensitivity of market based CEO pay to shareholder value 
after the stock market bubble burst in 2000. If traders acted more myopically in the 
run up to the stock market bubble then our model provides a possible rationale for the 
increase. Finally, the analysis speaks to issue of how stock markets affect real 
economic performance since there is cross-country cross-industry evidence that liquid 
stock markets promote economic efficiency via market based governance. 
6
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Why does CEO pay include measures of stock price performance? What are the limits to such
market based pay? To what extent do trading conditions, e.g. trading horizons, matter for the
cost and beneﬁt of market based CEO pay and, ultimately, real ﬁrm performance? Despite
a large literature on executive compensation and debates about market based CEO pay (see
for example Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004)), there is
hardly any research on how trading conditions in the stock market matter for market based
compensation (see for example the surveys by Murphy (1999) and Core et al. (2003a)).
This paper attempts to ﬁll the gap and shows that there is a natural trade-oﬀ when de-
signing market based pay. Whenever the stock price contains useful information for incentive
contracting, it must also contain useless information. The trade-oﬀ between useful and use-
less information in designing optimal market based CEO pay and empirical implications about
the role of trading conditions arise naturally from combining two well known but hitherto un-
connected insights from the incentive literature and the literature on information aggregation
in asset markets. On the one hand Holmstr¨ om (1979)’s informativeness principle says that
any signal that is not informative about managerial eﬀort should not be used to condition a
manager’s compensation scheme. On the other hand, the no-trade theorems of Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) and Milgrom and Stokey (1982) stipulate that information trading by spec-
ulators is impossible without noise trading, i.e. trading that is unrelated to any information
about the value of the asset being traded, e.g. the shares of a ﬁrm.
The beneﬁt of market based pay is that the market as a whole, i.e. the sum of all speculators’
information, takes a picture of managerial performance at an early stage before the ﬁnal long-
term value of a ﬁrm materializes. The stock market therefore provides value neutral information
that has no direct impact on future managerial decisions but provides an assessment of past
decisions.1 In a competitive market in which the ownership of listed companies is dispersed, it
1Stock markets also provides value enhancing information, i.e. information about future corporate strategy.
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this communication problem, albeit imperfectly. In order to make room for information trading
by speculators, some people must trade for reasons other than information about the value of
the ﬁrm, e.g. stochastic life cycle motives or the need to fulﬁll margin calls. The cost of market
based pay therefore is that it will necessarily be contingent on such noise trading although noise
trading per se is not informative about managerial eﬀort. Our contribution is to point out that
the cost of market based pay is inextricably linked to its beneﬁt.
Combining a multi-period trading model with eﬃcient pricing (we follow the formulation
of Vives (1995)) and a standard incentive contracting framework, we show how speculators’
trading horizons aﬀect the balance between the beneﬁt and the cost of market based pay.
Speculators with short horizons act less on their private information since the stock price
reﬂects this information only imperfect at the time they need to sell the asset.2 This reduces
the amount of information trading relative to noise trading. The stock price becomes less
informative about managerial performance, market based incentives weaken and managerial
eﬀort subsides leading to worse ﬁrm performance on average.
Recent empirical research by Kang and Liu (2005) establishes a signiﬁcant positive link
between the extent of market based CEO pay in the US and the informativeness of the stock
price (see also Garvey and Swan (2002) for a related result). Moreover, they ﬁnd that the
sensitivity of CEO pay to stock price movements increases after the stock market bubble burst
in 2000. If there was more short-term trading in the run up of the bubble than after it had
burst, then our analysis is consistent with their ﬁndings.
To the best of our knowledge, our trade-oﬀ between useful and useless information in design-
ing marked based CEO pay due to trading and examining the impact of short trading horizons
Dow and Gorton (1997) analyze the interaction between these two types of information when managers make
investment decisions.
2Shleifer and Vishny (1990) and Allen and Gorton (1993) give reasons why traders may have short invest-
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February 2007is new. Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1993) examine the role of noise trading in a static model.
They show that more noise trading motivates a single large insider to collect additional infor-
mation about management. More noise trading allows him to better hide his informed trades
and therefore to make larger proﬁts that oﬀset the cost of collecting more precise information.
Some of his information nevertheless ﬂows into the stock price and improves its information
content. More noise trading always leads to more market based pay via the indirect monitor-
ing by the insider. In contrast, we show that more noise trading leads to less market based
pay. This more pessimistic view of the role of uninformed trading on CEO incentives is a
direct consequence of the fundamental diﬃculty that the stock price cannot aggregate useful
but dispersed information without including also useless information.3
Kim and Suh (1993) point to a measurement problem when examining market based CEO
pay. They argue that using the ”raw” price to construct market measures is problematic
since the stock price impounds public information from earnings reports in addition to private
information. As a result empirical studies may exaggerate the importance of market based
pay.4 Paul (1992) shows that stock prices do not provide eﬃcient multi-task incentives. To
do that, stock prices would have to measure the value-added of the manager for each activity.
But stock prices only convey information about the total value of the ﬁrm. The disadvantage
of market based pay is that it may skew manager’s incentives towards particular activities.5
If one of management’s activities can be the exaggeration of performance, then Goldman and
Slezak (2006) show how stock based performance contracts induce CEOs to waste resources
by manipulating the information transmitted to investors. Bolton et al. (2006) also take up
the multi-tasking issue in a static model and ask: what if the market is ineﬃcient so that the
3We discuss Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1993) and its empirical relevance further in section 4.
4In an earlier paper without trading, Diamond and Verrecchia (1982) analyze a related ﬁltering issue for
the use of stock prices in CEO pay. In their model, all investors receive the same signal and the stock price
perfectly reveals the common signal. Since the stock price conveys information about noise that is unrelated
to management eﬀort, the optimal CEO pay in Diamond and Verrecchia depends positively of ﬁnal output and
negatively on the stock price.
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a CEO has an incentive to wastefully increase the risk of his ﬁrm to play up the speculative
component of the stock price.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a static benchmark model
to introduce the trade-oﬀ between useful and useless information when designing market based
CEO pay. The static benchmark prepares the ground for the dynamic extension to which we
turn in section 3 and show how speculators’ trading horizons aﬀect managerial pay and eﬀort.
Section 4 discusses our results in the light of existing empirical evidence. Section 5 concludes.
All proofs are contained in the appendix.
2 The static benchmark: market based compensation
and price informativeness
The model assumes a standard moral-hazard problem between the owners and the manage-
ment of a publicly traded ﬁrm. We introduce active trading of the ﬁrm’s shares in a large
competitive market where speculators have heterogenous, dispersed and imperfect information
about the future value of the ﬁrm. Speculators’ self-interested trading leads to an aggregation
of information in the stock price that may be useful for incentivizing management.
A publicly traded ﬁrm is run by a risk-averse manager (the agent) whose unobservable eﬀort
drives the expected value of the ﬁrm. A collective of risk-neutral inside owners (the principal)
owns the ﬁrm. They are value oriented investors in the sense that they hold the ﬁrm’s shares
until the ﬁrm is liquidated.
The company stock is traded by a continuum of informed risk-averse speculators, indexed by
i ∈ [0,1]. Each speculator possesses diﬀerent imperfect information about the value of the ﬁrm.
Moreover, there are noise traders who trade for reasons that are not related to any information
about the ﬁrm. Finally, there is a risk-neutral market making sector that ensures that the stock
10
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price will be eﬃcient and reﬂects all publicly available information.We ﬁrst present a static benchmark that illustrates the trade-oﬀ between useful and useless
information when designing market based CEO pay. The static case sets the stage for exploring
the impact of short trading horizons in the dynamic extension of the model. The sequence of
events is as follows. First, the principal hires a manager to run the ﬁrm and signs an incentive
contract with him. Second, the manager exerts an unobservable eﬀort e that determines the
expected future value of the ﬁrm, v = e + θ, where θ ∼ N(0,σ2
θ). Third, each speculator
privately receives imperfect information about the value of the ﬁrm si = v + εi, where εi are
i.i.d. random variables, εi ∼ N(0,σ2
ε). Trading then results in a share price p. Fourth, the
manager quits the ﬁrm and is paid according to his incentive contract. His income contains a
ﬁxed wage, a market based element contingent on the stock price p and a non-market based
element contingent on a signal y that is available at the moment the manager quits the ﬁrm
and that contains unbiased but noisy information about the future value of the ﬁrm: y = v+η,
where η ∼ N(0,σ2
η). The manager’s total income I therefore is:6
I = a0 + app + ayy (1)
Finally, the value of the ﬁrm v realizes and the ﬁrm is liquidated at a net value π. The diﬀerence
between the value of the ﬁrm v and its liquidation value π results from the cost of compensating
the manager.
The manager’s preferences are represented by a CARA utility function deﬁned over income
minus the (monetary) cost of eﬀort: Um(e) = −exp[−rm(I − 1
2e2)], where rm is the coeﬃcient
of constant absolute risk-aversion for the manager.
Owners choose an incentive contract (a0,ap,ay) that maximizes their expected wealth,
max
a0,ap,ay
E[v − I] (2)
6We conform to the standard practice that the contract is linear in the signals.
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and subject to the manager’s participation constraint:
E[Um(e)] ≥ 0 (4)
where we have normalized the manager’s outside opportunity to zero.
The ﬁrm’s shares are traded in a standard competitive noisy rational expectations market
(we follow the model of Vives (1995)). A speculator i maximizes the expected CARA utility
of his return from buying xi shares of the company stock at a price p:
Ui(xi) = −exp[−rxi(π − p)] (5)
where r is a speculator’s coeﬃcient of constant absolute risk aversion.
Speculators have rational expectations, i.e. they use all information available to them. This
means that they condition their trading not only on their private signal si but also on the
publicly observable price p. A speculator’s strategy therefore maps his private information si
into a demand function xi(si,p).
As is standard in the literature on informed speculative trading, there are noise or unin-
formed traders who trade the company stock for exogenous reasons. Their demand u is assumed
to be random according to u ∼ N(0,σ2
u) and independent of all other random variables in the
model. The idea is that there are factors other than information about the company that cause
its stock price to vary. Examples are stochastic life cycle motives, margin calls or requirements
for investors to hold certain assets in ﬁxed proportions.
The stock price is determined by a competitive risk neutral market making sector. It
12
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xi(si,p)di + u (6)
and sets the price eﬃciently:
p = E[π|L(p)] (7)












ing in a competitive
market results in
stock price p .
The manager quits the
ﬁrm. He is paid in-
come I that is based
on the stock price p
and the non-price sig-
nal y.
Firm is liquidated
for a gross value v.
Figure 1: The timing of events
2.1 Incentives and information















Since the market price will reﬂect the speculators’ inference process about the value of the ﬁrm
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information based trading u, we use the general notation E[p] for the moment. The condition
shows that any appropriate linear combination of market based compensation ap and non-
market based compensation ay induces the same eﬀort level.
The cheapest way to induce eﬀort is to minimize the income risk borne by the risk-averse
manager. An optimal contract must therefore choose ap and ay to minimize the variance of
managerial income, V ar[I], subject to eﬀort being optimal for the manager (equation (9). The








We can use this condition to illustrate the information structure of the model. Since the
speculators’ individual errors εi cancel out, the market as a whole has early information about
the future value of the ﬁrm and thus managerial performance,
R
sidi = v. The value of the
ﬁrm v itself is not available for contracting since it is realized only in the future and after the
manager has left the ﬁrm. If the incentive contract could include total market information,
R
sidi then the contract should not use the non-market information y as this would only add
extra noise to the manager’s pay. Replacing p with
R
sidi in equation (10) implies that ay = 0.
In our set-up, market information is a suﬃcient statistic for eﬀort (see Holmstr¨ om (1979)).7
But an incentive contract cannot include the information of all the speculators operating in a
competitive market. Instead, a contract can only include the stock price that is the outcome of
decentralized self-interested trading. The competitive market as a whole therefore has useful
but not directly accessible information about management performance.
7This is not the case in Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1993). There the market does not take an early picture
of future ﬁrm value. Instead, the market (in their case a single large insider) provides additional information
about the value of the ﬁrm.
14
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rV ar[π − p|si,p]
(11)
We follow Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1993) and normalize the price and the incentive contract
in order to separate the trading and the incentive problem. The manager is paid a0+app in
cash and the amount ayy is paid in shares transferred from long-term inside owners to the
manager. This accounting convention leaves payoﬀs unchanged and the net liquidation value
of the ﬁrm is π = v − a0 − app. The fraction of shares α that must be transferred is given by
ayy = αE[v − a0 − app|y,p] since this is the fair price given public information.
Letting ˆ p be the normalized share price8
ˆ p = a0 + (1 + ap)p (12)
we can write the manager’s income as follows:
Proposition 1 Managerial income is linear in the normalized price ˆ p and the non-price signal
y.
I = ˆ a0 + ˆ aˆ pˆ p + ˆ ayy (13)
where ˆ a0 =
(1−α)apa0
1+ap ,ˆ ay = α
τη
τη+τ and ˆ aˆ p = 1 − ˆ ay.
The eﬃcient pricing of shares (7) becomes ˆ p = E[v|L(ˆ p)] and a speculator’s demand (11)
now is:
xi(si, ˆ p) =
E[v|si, ˆ p] − ˆ p
rV ar[v|si, ˆ p]
(14)
8The prices p and ˆ p are informationally equivalent.
15
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demand as:
xi(si, ˆ p) = βsi + f(ˆ p) (15)
where β is the trading intensity of an informed trader on his private information and f(ˆ p) is a
linear function of the price.




xi(si, ˆ p)di + u = β(e + θ) + u + f(ˆ p)
= z + f(ˆ p)
where z = β(e + θ) + u is the part of the aggregate limit order book that is informative about
the value of the ﬁrm v. The price setting condition ˆ p = E[v|L(ˆ p)] can therefore be written as
ˆ p = E[v|z]. The following proposition shows the equilibrium price ˆ p and the trading intensity
β:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium price ˆ p = E[v|z] is given by:
ˆ p = (1 − λβ)e
∗ + λβ(e + θ) + λu (16)









where τj = 1/σ2
j denotes the precision of random variable j and τ = V ar[v|ˆ p]−1 = β2τu + τθ is
the informativeness of the price.
In a rational expectations equilibrium the actual eﬀort e and the hypothesized equilibrium
16
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ˆ p = e
∗ + λβθ + λu (19)
The share price is aﬀected by two random shocks, one that is useful for incentive contracting
while the other is not. The key issue is that they are inextricably linked. One shock is due to
information trading by speculators. It provides information about θ, the shock that garbles the
impact of managerial eﬀort on ﬁrm value. This information is useful for incentive contracting
as it allows to give better incentives to risk-averse management. The other shock is due to
non-information trading u. It adds extra noise to the stock price that is unrelated to the moral
hazard problem and that should ideally not aﬀect managerial incentives. But without non-
information trading, there will be no information trading: if σ2
u = 0 then λβ = 1 and the price
is ˆ p = v = e + θ. The price then provides more accurate information about the value of the
ﬁrm than a speculator’s signal si. Speculators would disregard their own signals and only use
the information conveyed by the price. But this begs the question of how information can ﬂow
into the price in the ﬁrst place (this is a version of the ”no-trade” or ”no speculation” results
of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Milgrom and Stokey (1982)).
2.3 Market based compensation and price informativeness
Lambert and Larcker (1987) show that in order to carry out cross-sectional analyses of the
attributes of compensation contracts, it is preferable to focus on the relative weights placed on
performance measures in order to reduce the confounding factors of CEO risk aversion, their
outside opportunities or disutility of eﬀort. We therefore present the following result:
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e = [1 + r(τ
−1
θ + (τη + τ − τθ)
−1)]
−1 (21)
Proposition 3 shows that the ratio of market based compensation relative to non-market
based compensation is given by the ratio of price informativeness τ = V ar[v|ˆ p]−1 to the precision
of non-market information τη. Equation (20) also shows that the ratio is proportional to the
liquidity of the market λ−1 ceteris paribus.9 A competitive stock price aggregates dispersed
and heterogenous information about the ﬁrm via self-interested speculative trading, and a more
liquid market allows more information based speculative trading.10 Reacting to his incentive
pay, the CEO exerts higher eﬀort and thus increases expected ﬁrm value when the stock price
is more informative (higher τ).
Using the results from proposition 2, the following corollary collects the comparative statics
of the ratio of market to non-market based pay and CEO eﬀort with respect to the parameters
of the model.
Corollary 1 The relative weight on market based pay increases if i) speculators have better
information (lower σ2
ε), ii) speculators are less risk averse (lower r), iii) the non-market infor-
mation is less precise (higher σ2
η), iv) future ﬁrm value is less volatile (lower σ2
θ) and v) there is
less noise trading (lower σ2
u). CEO eﬀort increases when vi) there is less noise trading, vii) a
more precise non-market signal, viii) a lower volatility of ﬁnal ﬁrm value, ix) speculators have
better information and x) they are less risk averse.
More non-information trading u increases the liquidity of the market λ−1 but it also adds
noise to the stock price that is unrelated to managerial eﬀort. The overall impact of more noise
trading on market based pay and eﬀort is negative since it reduces the informativeness of the
price τ = V ar[v|ˆ p]−1.
9Kyle (1985) introduced the inverse of the resilience of the price to order shocks, λ−1, as an intuitive measure
of market liquidity.
10This corresponds to Bagehot (1971)’s classic intuition that a market is more liquid if informed speculators
trade more with each other.
18
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the positive eﬀect in Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1993). They do not consider the aggregation of
useful but dispersed information via the stock price. Instead they examine how noise trading
motivates a single large insider to collect additional costly information about the performance
of management. More noise trading allows the trader to better hide his informed trades, to
make more proﬁts and to better recoup the cost of collecting information. It is an indirect eﬀect
of noise trading that operates via the precision of speculators’ information τε, and, according to
result i) of the corollary, more precise information for speculators leads to more market based
pay.11
A lower variance of θ increases the relative weight the contract places on the stock price
and CEO eﬀort since it increases the liquidity of the market. A more liquid market is one that
allows a better aggregation of information leading to a more informative stock price and hence
more market based incentives.
3 The dynamic case: market-based compensation and
speculators’ horizon
Having shown that there is natural trade-oﬀ between useful and useless information when
making managerial pay contingent on the ﬁrm’s stock price, we now examine how shortening
speculators’ investment horizons aﬀects this trade-oﬀ. A short investment horizon reduces the
aggressiveness with which speculators trade on their information and makes the aggregation of
dispersed information via competitive trading less eﬃcient. The stock price will therefore take
11If we allow the precision of dispersed private information to increase with the amount of noise trading to
incorporate the indirect eﬀect of Holmstr¨ om and Tirole, the overall impact of noise trading on market-based
pay is still negative as long as there are no increasing returns to scale in information collection that are stronger
than inversely proportional. Suppose that τε = τε(τu) with τ0
ε < 0. Then
∂(ˆ ap)/ˆ ay
∂τu > 0 iﬀ τ0
ε/τε > −τ−1
u . This
holds as long as τε(τu) is less steeply curved than τε(τu) = τ−1
u . Our direct negative eﬀect of noise trading on
the informativeness of the price is therefore likely to outweigh the indirect positive eﬀect of Holmstr¨ om and
Tirole that operates via the precision of speculators’ information .
19
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give market based incentives to management.
3.1 Adding a round of trading
We extend the static benchmark by adding an extra round of trading before the manager quits












ing in a competitive
market results in stock
price p1.
A second round of
trading results in
stock price p2.
The manager quits the
ﬁrm. He is paid in-
come I that is based
on the stock prices p1
and p2, and the non-
price signal y.
Firm is liquidated
for a gross value v.
Figure 2: The timing of events
Managerial pay income is now given by
I = a0 + a1p1 + a2p2 + ayy









be the order ﬂow the market makers observe in the ﬁrst trading round when an informed trader
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is the net order ﬂow in the second trading round.
As in the static case, a competitive risk-neutral market making sector observing the aggre-
gate limit order book ensures eﬃcient pricing:
p1 = E[π|L1] (22)
p2 = E[π|L1,L2] (23)
As before, we focus on linear symmetric equilibria in which a speculator’s demand xit is linear in
prices pt and his signal si, and we write the informative part of the order book as z1 = β1v+u1
and z2 = (β2 − β1)v + u2. We again normalize prices
ˆ p1 = a0 + (1 + a1 + a2)p1 (24)
ˆ p2 = a0 + a1p1 + (1 + a2)p2 (25)
to rewrite (22) and (23) as:12
ˆ p1 = E[v|z1] (26)
ˆ p2 = E[v|z1,z2] (27)
The next proposition characterizes the pricing functions in the dynamic case.
12As in the static case, we follow Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1993). The manager is paid his ﬁxed and market
based pay in cash and the remainder is paid by transferring shares from inside owners. This accounting
convention yields a net liquidation value of the ﬁrm π = v − a0 − ap1p1 − ap2p2.
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February 2007Proposition 4 The ﬁrst and second period stock price are given by:
ˆ p1 = (1 − λ1β1)e
∗ + λ1β1(e + θ) + λ1u1
ˆ p2 = (1 −
τ1
τ2








where e∗ is the hypothesized equilibrium eﬀort, e is the actual eﬀort, τ1 = V ar[v|z1]−1 = τθ +
β2




λ2 = (β2 − β1)
τu
τ2
The speculators’ trading aggressiveness βt that determines the liquidity of the market λ
−1
t
in each period depends on the trading horizon. We consider two cases. First, we present the
benchmark case of speculators with long investment horizons who can trade in both periods and
show that this case will be identical to the static model above. We therefore conﬁrm that adding
another trading round by itself, i.e. without shortening trading horizons, is innocuous since a
competitive market with long investing horizons incorporates information into the stock price
immediately. We then consider the case of two generations of short-term or myopic speculators
who trade only for one period.
A speculator with a long investing horizon maximizes the expected utility of wealth from
gains in both trading periods:
Ui(xi1,xi2) = −exp[−r(xi1(p2 − p1) + xi2(π − p2))]
The following proposition describes such a speculator’s trading aggressiveness:
Proposition 5 With long investing horizons, speculators’ trading aggressiveness is constant
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February 2007There is no information trading in the second period so that speculators with long investment
horizons pursue a buy-and-hold strategy. Consequently, any non-information trading in the
second period u2 is absorbed by the competitive risk-neutral market making sector: the market
is inﬁnitely liquid in the second period, λ2 = (β2−β1)τu/τ2 = 0, and the ﬁrst and second period
price are the same, ˆ p1 = ˆ p2. The manager’s contract and eﬀort are the same as in propositions
3 where τ = τ1 = τ2 = β2τ + τθ and β = β1 = β2 = τε/r.
3.2 The eﬀect of speculators’ short-termism on market based com-
pensation
Speculators with short trading horizons maximize
E[−exp(−r(xi1(p2 − p1)))|si,p1] (28)
in the ﬁrst period and
E[−exp(−r(xi2(π − p2)))|si,p1,p2] (29)
in the second period.
We assume that speculators in the second period have access to all the information of the
ﬁrst period. The set-up therefore represents either a situation where speculators live for two
periods but undertake successive myopic one-period investments, or a situation where a new
generation of short-lived speculators enters the market in the second period inheriting the
knowledge of the previous generation.
Proposition 6 With short investing horizons, speculators’ trading aggressiveness increases
over time: β1 =
τετ2
r(τε+τ2) < β2 = τε
r .
Speculators with a short investment horizon hold back in the ﬁrst period because they have
information about the ﬁnal value of the ﬁrm v but cannot hold the asset until this value realizes.
23
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 735
February 2007Instead they need to close their position early at a price ˆ p2, which is only an imperfect estimate
of future ﬁrm value v. Speculators have therefore fewer incentives to trade aggressively on their
information in the ﬁrst period.
A ﬁrst consequence of less aggressive information trading in the ﬁrst period is that an
optimal incentive contract is not contingent on the ﬁrst period stock price.
Proposition 7 Optimal CEO pay will not be based on the stock price in the ﬁrst period.
Since the optimal incentive contract for the CEO does not include the ﬁrst period price ˆ p1
as a performance measure, the analysis of managerial incentives parallels the one carried out in
the static case. The result in propositions 3 carries over with the informativeness of the stock
price now being τ2 = τθ + (β2
1 + (β2 − β1)2)τu, and speculators’ trading aggressiveness being
β1 = τετ2/(r(τε + τ2)) and β2 = τε/r (propositions 4 and 6).
The next proposition summarizes the impact of short-termism in the stock market via
market-based pay on CEO eﬀort.
Proposition 8 When speculators have short trading horizons then CEO pay is less contingent
on the stock price and the CEO exerts less eﬀort than when speculators have long trading
horizons.
Speculators with shorter trading horizons trade less aggressively on their information. This
reduces the information content of the stock price, worsens the trade-oﬀ between useful and
useless information and makes it more costly to provide market based incentives to management,
which in turn leads to less managerial eﬀort and ultimately to lower expected ﬁrm value.
4 Discussion and empirical implications
Recent empirical research by Garvey and Swan (2002) and Kang and Liu (2005) establishes a
signiﬁcant cross-sectional link between the extent of stock-based CEO pay and trading condi-
tions in the market market for a sample of publicly traded US corporations that is consistent
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February 2007with our analysis. Kang and Liu (2005) ﬁnd that CEO pay is more sensitive to changes in
shareholder value when more information is impounded into stock prices. They measure the
informativeness of the stock price using the PIN of Easley et al. (1997) (see for example Chen
et al. (2006)) for an application of the PIN as a measure of stock price informativeness in
a diﬀerent context) and also using the dispersion and error of analysts’ forecasts. Similarly,
Garvey and Swan (2002) ﬁnd a negative link between both the bid-ask spread and the ratio of
turnover to market capitalization and the extent of market-based CEO pay. They argue that
the impact of these two measures of market liquidity on CEO pay is at least as large as the
eﬀect of traditional cross-sectional determinants such as size, risk or industry.13
Our paper provides a suitable theoretical background for these results. Proposition 3 shows
that a more informative stock price and a more liquid market lead to more market based
pay ceteris paribus. It is more diﬃcult to reconcile these empirical ﬁndings with the analysis
of Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1993). First, they focus on the role of a single large insider in
monitoring management indirectly via strategic trading against uninformed traders. Hartzell
and Starks (2003) ﬁnd evidence against such indirect monitoring since more institutional
investor concentration leads to subsequent changes in CEO pay but not vice versa as one
would expect if investor concentration and incentive compensation arose simultaneously and
endogenously.14 Large insiders such as institutional investors appear to inﬂuence CEO pay
more directly, e.g. through shareholder activism. Second, Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1993)
focus only on role of noise traders and their positive impact on market-based CEO pay. Both
Garvey and Swan (2002) and Kang and Liu (2005) however examine the general, informal
13Schipper and Smith (1986) provide indirect evidence for the positive link between liquidity and market
based CEO pay by examining carve-outs. After selling a subsidiary to the public equity market, management
typically receives compensation contracts that include the new company’s stock.
14An information monopolist trading strategically in the US stock market may also run the danger of violating
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. Courts have interpreted this section in conjunction with Rule 10b-
5 to prohibit insider trading by a corporate ”outsider” (see http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm for more
information.) Moreover, Laﬀont and Maskin (1990) show that a single large trader with private information
typically ﬁnds it more proﬁtable to conceal his private information and to trade in such a way that the price
does not reﬂect his private information at all.
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based pay. Our analysis shows that the link between noise trading, price informativeness and
market based pay is not straight-forward. While a more informative price always leads to more
market based pay ceteris paribus (proposition 3), this is not the case for the amount of noise
trading (corollary 1). Third, an issue of analyzing market-based CEO pay in a model with a
single informed trader is its robustness to the threat of collusion between management and the
outside source of information about management performance. This issue does not arise in our
analysis since information is highly dispersed across a competitive market.
Our model may also provide a new perspective on the debate on the relationship between risk
and incentives (see Prendergast (2002)). Core et al. (2003b) for example ﬁnd that counter
to the standard predictions of agency models, the variation in the relative weight on price
and non-price measures in total CEO compensation is an increasing function of their relative
variances. One possible explanation is based on the observation that a more informative stock
price is also more volatile.15 Adding trading to a standard agency problem, as in our paper,
can generate a positive relationship between relative incentives and the volatility of price based
performance measures via the informativeness of the stock price.
According to proposition 8, shorter investment horizons of traders should lead to less market
based CEO pay and lower CEO eﬀort. To our knowledge, this prediction has not yet been
tested directly. Kang and Liu (2005) however show in a robustness test a sharp increase in
the positive link between measures of stock price informativeness and the sensitivity of market
based CEO pay to shareholder value after the stock market bubble burst in 2000. If traders
acted more myopically in the run up to the stock market bubble then our model provides a
possible rationale for the increase. Short-termism in the market made stock prices less good at
aggregating dispersed information in the years prior to 2000 so that the market took a blurrier
picture of future ﬁrm performance weakening market based incentives in equilibrium.16
15This can be seen from V ar[ˆ p] = V ar[E[v|ˆ p]] = V ar[v] − V ar[v|ˆ p].
16Note that our analysis and the cited evidence examine the composition of CEO pay but not its level.
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February 2007The role of the stock market in our model is to provide information about the performance
of ﬁrm management. Decentralized speculative trading aggregates dispersed information about
the ﬁrm into its stock price. More speculative information trading therefore promotes eco-
nomic eﬃciency via more eﬃcient incentive contracting. Using industry level data across 38
countries, Tadesse (2004) ﬁnds that liquid stock markets promote economic performance via
market based governance. Gupta (2005) identiﬁes the positive role of ﬁnancial markets as in-
formation producers on ﬁrm performance. She studies partial privatization programs in which
government sells only non-controlling shares to the public. This approach allows to eliminate
the confounding eﬀect of direct shareholder control on the relationship between stock market
trading and ﬁrm performance.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a model where the beneﬁt of market based CEO pay is that the stock
market aggregates useful but dispersed private information about past managerial performance
via self-interested trading. But speculators only trade on their private information if there is
non-information trading, e.g. trade due to margin calls or life-cycle motives. Non-information
or noise trading is unrelated to management’s action and should therefore not aﬀect their
incentive schemes according to Holmstr¨ om’s ”informativeness principle”. But since such noise
trading makes room for information trading, it is a necessary cost of market based pay.
The balance between useful and useless information when designing market based pay is
reﬂected in the liquidity of the market. A more liquid market allows more information trading
and is therefore better at aggregating dispersed information. Short trading horizons reduce
liquidity. They lower the aggressiveness with which speculators trade on their private informa-
tion since the stock price reﬂects their information only imperfectly at the time they need to
close their positions. Short-termism makes the stock price less informative about management
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performance and weakens market based incentives.A natural extension of our set-up is to have a richer moral-hazard problem, perhaps one in
which management performs several diﬀerent tasks. Such a model could formalize the intuition
of Froot et al. (1992a) that tying CEO pay to stock prices when traders have short horizons
induces CEOs to focus on short-term earnings at the expense of long-term corporate strategy.
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In order to calculate the conditional distribution, we use the following standard result for normally
distributed variables:
Result 1 Let Yi be a (ni×1) vector with mean µi, i=1,2, and variance-covariance matrices Σij, then
Y2|Y1 = y1 ∼ N([µ2 + Σ21Σ−1
11 (y1 − µ1)],[Σ22 − Σ21Σ−1
11 Σ12])
We also make use of the following technical result from Danthine and Moresi (1993):
















When a = 0 the result describes the familiar certainty equivalent of normally distributed wealth W
with mean c and variance b2σ2.
Proof of proposition 1
It is easier to calculate the conditional expectation and variance using the following information
equivalent of price ˆ p,
ˆ ˆ p =
ˆ p − (1 − λβ)e∗
λβ




Using result (1) we have
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February 2007Substituting back and using τ = β2τu + τθ we obtain:
E[v|y, ˆ p] =
τηy + τˆ p
τη + τ
We can therefore rewrite managerial income as
I = a0 + app + ayy
= a0 + app + αE[v − a0 − app|y,p]
= (1 − α)a0 + (1 − α)
ˆ p − a0
1 + ap
















Proof of proposition 2
Let Y1 = z with mean µ1 = βe∗ and Σ11 = V ar(z) = β2σ2
θ + σ2
u, Y2 = v with mean µ2 = e∗ and
Σ22 = σ2
θ + σ2
η, and Σ21 = Σ12 = Cov[v,z] = βσ2
θ. Hence












u and substituting for z = β(e + θ) + u gives the result for ˆ p = E[v|z].
To solve for β we need to characterize the distribution of v|si, ˆ p. Using again result 1, let Y1 = (si, ˆ ˆ p)
with mean µ1 = (e∗,e∗) and Y2 = v with mean µ2 = e∗, where we use again the information equivalent

















and Σ22 = σ2
θ + σ2
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Substituting ˆ p for ˆ ˆ p and writing the expression in terms of precision τj = 1/σ2
j, we obtain:
E[v|si, ˆ p] =
τεsi + (β2τu + τθ)ˆ p
τε + (β2τu + τθ)
Next we need to calculate




























τε + (β2τu + τθ)
Last, substituting E[v|si, ˆ p] and V ar[v|si, ˆ ˆ p] = V ar[v|si, ˆ p] into (11) yields
xi(si, ˆ p) =
τε
r
(si − ˆ p)
This means that β = τε/r.
Proof of proposition 3
We use proposition 1 and replace the contract (a0,ap,ay) in (1) with (ˆ a0,ˆ ap,ˆ ay) and the stock price
p with ˆ p (equation (12)). The optimal contract still has to satisfy (10), but now with the normalized










Working Paper Series No 735 
February 2007Using proposition 2 to substitute for ˆ p and rearranging yields equation (20). To derive the expression
for optimal CEO eﬀort we need to calculate the absolute weights (ˆ aˆ p,ˆ ay) the contract places on the
stock price and the non-price signal.
Since the manager’s participation constraint (4) will be binding at the optimum, the optimal








subject to managerial eﬀort being optimal:
e = ˆ aˆ pλβ + ˆ ay (31)
Substituting for e, v, I, taking ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to ˆ aˆ p and ˆ ay, and rearranging gives











































which is the expression in the proposition after writing variances as precisions and using the deﬁnition
of τ in proposition 2.
Proof of proposition 4
Applying result 1 and writing expression in terms of precisions τj = 1/σ2
j:
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β1τu
β2
1τu+τθ, substituting z1 = β1(e + θ) + u and denoting τ1 = β2
1τu + τθ gives the result for
the ﬁrst period price.
Applying result 1 again and using notation from above:
E[v|z1,z2] = e∗(1−
β2
1τu + (β2 − β1)2τu
β2















and τ2 = τ1+(β2−β1)2τu gives the result for the second period price.
Proof of proposition 5
We follow the proof of proposition 4.1 in Vives (1995) and adapt it to our setting. Rewriting wealth




xi1(ˆ p2 − ˆ p1) + xi2(v − ˆ p2))]





i2(v − ˆ p2))|si, ˆ p2]
since the ﬁrst period wealth 1
1+a2xi1(ˆ p2 − ˆ p1) is known at t=2 and ˆ p1 does not add information given
that ˆ p2 is observed. Hence, the second period problem reduces to the static one and following the





Using i) the optimal second period trading strategy in (32), ii) the fact that E[v|si, ˆ p2] =
τεsi+τ2ˆ p2
τε+τ2
(from result 1) and iii) result 2 with z = v − E[v|si, ˆ p2] so that z|si, ˆ p2 ∼ N(0,V ar[v|si, ˆ p2]), and:
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(si − E[ˆ p2|si, ˆ p1])




(si − E[ˆ p2|si, ˆ p1])2
so that the expression in the exponent in (35) is of the form W = c + bz + az2 with z|si, ˆ p1 ∼
N(0,V ar[p2|si, ˆ p1]).
In order to derive the optimal ﬁrst period holding x1i, we only need to consider the part in the
37
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 735
February 2007exponent of result 2. Substituting for a,b and c, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to xi1 is:




τε+τ2(si − E[ˆ p2|si, ˆ p1])
1






rxi1 = (E[ˆ p2|si, ˆ p1] − ˆ p1)

1










(si − E[ˆ p2|si, ˆ p1])






(si − ˆ p1) +
E[p2|si, ˆ p1] − ˆ p1
rV ar[p2|si, ˆ p1]
(36)
Using result 1 with the pricing equations from proposition 4, one ﬁnds that:
E[ˆ p2|si, ˆ p1] = ˆ p1 +
(τ2 − τ1)τε
τ2(τ1 + τε)
(si − ˆ p1)
V ar[ˆ p2|si, ˆ p1] =
(τ2 − τ1)(τε + τ2)
τ2
2(τ1 + τε)




(s1 − ˆ p1)
which means that β1 = β2 = τε
r .
Proof of proposition 6
The situation in the second period with a short investing horizon is identical to the one with a long
horizon. Thus we know from proposition 5 that β2 = τε/r.
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E[ˆ p2 − ˆ p1|si, ˆ p1]
V ar[ˆ p2 − ˆ p1|si, ˆ p1]
(37)
Using the pricing functions of proposition 4 we can write
E[ˆ p2 − ˆ p1|si, ˆ p1] = λ2(β2 − β1)E[v − ˆ p1|si, ˆ p1]
V ar[ˆ p2 − ˆ p1|si, ˆ p1] = λ2
2((β2 − β1)2V ar[v − ˆ p1|si, ˆ p1] + σ2
u)
Result 1 allows to calculate
E[v|si, ˆ p1] =
τεsi + τ1ˆ p1
τε + τ1
V ar[v|si, ˆ p1] =
1
τε + τ1






(si + ˆ p1)
so that β1 = τετ2
r(τε+τ2).
Proof of proposition 7
As in the static case, maximizing expected net ﬁrm value (2) subject to the incentive constraint (3)
and the participation constraint (4) means that the dilution free contract (ˆ a1,ˆ a2,ˆ ay) solves
min
ˆ a1,ˆ a2,ˆ ay
V ar[I]
subject to
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V ar[ˆ p1] −
∂E[ˆ p1]
∂e





















The ﬁrst period stock price is therefore not included if
∂E[ˆ p2]
∂e











Some algebra (available on request from the authors) shows that after substituting β1 and β2 from
proposition 6 into the pricing functions of proposition 4 the conditions hold.
Proof of proposition 8
We need to compare the informativeness of the stock price V ar[v|ˆ p1, ˆ p2]−1 with long and short invest-
ment horizons. With long investment horizons, the information content is





and with short investment horizons it is














Thus, the information content of the stock price is lower when speculators have a short investment
horizon. The conclusions on the relative weight of market based pay and on CEO eﬀort then follow
directly from proposition 3.
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